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Registered Geographical Indications
Between Intellectual Property and Rural Policy – Part I*
William van CAENEGEM+
Associate Professor of Law
Bond University
Queensland, Australia.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of geographical terms1 in association with goods is common. But uses vary in 
crucial ways. At one end of the spectrum, a geographical term may be used simply to 
indicate the ultimate origin of goods: made in Australia, made in Germany, made in 
Taiwan. Such use does not intend to indicate anything about the characteristics of the 
goods.2 At the other end of the spectrum lies the use of geographical terms in a manner 
which says nothing about either the geographical origin of the goods or their 
characteristics: Cote d'Or for chocolate, Mont Blanc for pens.3 In the latter case, the use
of the term does not intend to indicate or guarantee the geographical origin, but the 
commercial origin of the goods - i.e. by whom they are provided.
The misuse of geographical terms in trade gives rise to various legal remedies. At one 
end lies an action for misrepresentation4 against a trader whose use of the term misleads 
consumers about their geographical origin: goods marked "Made in Japan" that are 
actually made in Taiwan, for instance.5 At the other end lies an action for infringement of 
a registered trade mark incorporating a geographical term: against a rival trader for 
attaching the mark Mont Blanc to pens, for instance. So if the use of the term falsely 
implies something to the consumer about the geographical origin of goods, the
* This article is published in two parts; Part I will appear in the November 2003 issue of The J.W.I.P. 
+ Many people have assisted me during my research for this article. At the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) in Geneva Matthijs Geuze, Denis Croze, Marcus Hopperger and Antony Taubman 
kindly made time to answer some of my questions. At the World Trade Organization (WTO) Adrian 
Otten, at the Max-Planck Institute in Munich Roland Knaak, at Canberra Toni Harmer of the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Tony Battaglene of the Australian Winemakers Federation, and at the 
European Union (EU) Directorate General for Trade in Brussels Antonio Berenguer did the same. Both 
Bond University Law School and the Law Program of the Research School of Social Sciences at the 
Australian National University (ANU) provided resources. My thanks are also due to Robert Burrell of 
the Australian Centre for Intellectual Property in Agriculture at the ANU, Faculty of Law, for his helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. This article represents the author's views, and not those of 
any other person or institution mentioned here.
1 I use the expression "geographical term" rather than place name, because of its wider import, including 
natural geographical features as well as names of districts, conurbations, towns, villages, etc.
2 Although even such use may indirectly imply something about the quality; goods made in Germany 
may have a general reputation for quality and durability, for instance.
3 That is not to say that the term implies nothing at all. Mont Blanc may suggest the "pinnacle" of pens, 
an implication which is derived from its geographic significance.
4 In some jurisdictions, an action for unfair competition, or for misleading and deceptive conduct in 
trade. 
5 In Australia see, for example, Siddons Pty Ltd. v. The Stanley Works Pty Ltd., (1990) 18 IPR 630.
remedy lies in the realm of an action for misrepresentation. The use, in terms of 
geography, is not fanciful, as is the case with registered trade marks, but descriptive – it 
says something about the goods in and of itself.6
Crucial to the distinction between misrepresentation and registered trade-mark 
infringement is the significance consumers attach to the geographical term.7 If it is used 
in a manner shorn of any geographical meaning, then the remedy lies in the realm of 
registered trade-marks laws. The term's use is fanciful; it does not identify the 
geographical origin of the goods in and of itself, but rather the trade origin of goods. If 
the registered mark informs the consumer about the qualities of the marked goods,8 it 
does this only indirectly; not because of the descriptive meaning of the term but because 
consumers have come to associate certain qualities with an identifiable trade source.
The current international debate revolves around the European Union's (EU) proposals 
for the expansion of a hybrid system, that of “registered geographical indications (GIs)”, 
which already exists under municipal and EU laws. Such registered GIs fulfil two 
functions: they guarantee both the geographical origins of goods and certain qualities or 
characteristics of goods in relation to which the GI is used.9 They cannot be registered as 
ordinary trade marks because they are descriptive rather than distinctive; and arguably, an 
action in misrepresentation is not a sufficient remedy because the terms are guaranteed to 
do more than just identify geographical origins, they also assure consumers, by the 
imposition of separate product standards and controls, of the characteristics of the goods 
concerned.10
Registered GI systems of this kind require a priori geographical delineation and setting 
of the quality standards to be observed within delineated regions. From that perspective 
such regulatory systems are instruments of rural and agricultural policy as well as 
perhaps belonging in the category “intellectual property”. For a system of registration of 
GIs that only guarantees geographical origin and not additional compliance with product 
standards, the availability of an action for misrepresentation may be a perfectly viable 
alternative. However, actions for misrepresentation in relation
6 An action for misrepresentation requires proof of reputation and of some degree of deception of 
consumers as to true geographical origin. But registered trade-mark infringement is actionable without 
any proof of reputation or deception of consumers if the registered mark is used on the same kind of 
goods.
7 In some cases a sign rather than a term, for instance a bear for Berne, Switzerland, or the Eiffel Tower 
for Paris, France.
8 A registered trade mark incorporating a geographical term is capable of distinguishing the goods of 
one trader from those of another trader, rather than the goods of one region from the goods from 
another region. Broadly speaking, the trader is the registered owner of the registered trade mark. 
Again, that the use of the term is fanciful does not mean it is without meaning; the trade origin of 
goods can indirectly signal the characteristics of the goods to consumers who have learned by 
experience that goods with the mark have certain consistent qualities. But the trade mark does not in 
itself, and not necessarily by implication, indicate anything about the quality or characteristics of the 
goods.
9 To use more technical terms, they are more than mere indications of source.
10 This is the EU model of GI registration, with origin and quality requirements enforced. The 
eponymous example is the term "Champagne". Used in relation to wine, it indicates not only a wine 
from the Champagne region of France, but also a sparkling wine of a certain character (dry rather than 
sweet) made with consistent methods.
to geographical terms are, in addition to the uncertainties common to all such actions, 
also subject to uncertainty about proper geographical delineation.11 For that reason, it 
may be rational, at the very least, to combine the availability of an ordinary action for 
misrepresentation with a system of a priori delineation of relevant geographical areas.
The term “geographical indication” is used in the context of regulatory regimes with 
rather varied characteristics12 In particular, some registration regimes do not require the 
imposition of independent product standards.13 The term "registered geographical 
indication" is used throughout this article to refer to a registration model requiring both 
proof of geographical origin and strict observance of product standards. The object of this 
article is to assess the theory and policy goals of registered GIs along the lines of existing 
EU regulations and analogous World Trade Organization (WTO) provisions and 
proposals14 Crucial characteristics are set out first below.15 The discussion is limited to 
the use of registered GIs for foodstuffs, i.e. in an agricultural context.
For the sake of this article then, registered GIs are geographical names (direct GIs), or 
names that are closely associated in consumers' minds with identified geographical areas 
(indirect GIs), used in relation to foodstuffs that:
 prior to registration, are not the ordinary term used to describe all foodstuffs of a 
certain kind;
 indicate that the foodstuffs originate in the area identified;
 indicate that the foodstuffs have been produced, processed or prepared in 
accordance with specifications that apply to all foodstuffs of that kind produced in 
that area.
11 In other words, it does not provide a priori rules as to how regions are delineated and who falls within 
a region and has an entitlement as a result.
12 The terms are used in various international instruments and also in the domestic legislation of a 
number of countries, with varying definitions and legal effects. For an account of international 
instruments, see Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical 
Indications, Eighth Session (SCT 8/4), Document SCT/6/3 Rev.on Geographical Indications: 
Historical Background, Nature of Rights, Existing Systems for Protection and Obtaining Protection in 
other Countries, prepared by the Secretariat; and for an example of use of the term in domestic law, 
see the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation Act 1980 (Cth). The terms cover rather more than is 
immediately apparent; this is the source of some confusion and uncertainty at the level of international 
negotiations. For instance, some terms are "indirect" GIs, i.e. not actual geographical terms, but other 
words that have become closely associated with a certain geographical area over time, such as, for 
instance, feta, a non-geographical term associated with certain cheese-producing regions in Greece.
13 The most long-established, common and well known registration systems are concerned with GIs for 
wine, but even these are quite varied. Other registration systems are related to foodstuffs, of which 
cheese is a prime example. In some countries registration of industrial goods is also possible, e.g. in 
France.
14 For the purpose of investigating the theoretical underpinnings of GI registration, little can be gained by 
comparing the different models used around the world first, or by entering into the detail of the 
terminological debate. The French and European systems of GI registration are dealt with in more 
detail below, as is the system in Australia.
15 The various elements being derived from the French and EU Models of GI registration, in particular 
appellations of origin/protected appellations (AOC/AOP ) in France and protected designations of 
origin/protected geographical indications (PDO/PGI) under Regulation 2081/92 in the EU, and the 
provision of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) as 
well as recent proposals in that forum.
The above specifications must be certified and enforced by a public body, and the 
geographical term concerned must be officially registered as a result of the certification.
The principal legal characteristics are as follows:
 GIs can only be registered in the name of a collective or organization;
 the collective or organization must represent producers of the foodstuffs within 
the area identified;
 the ownership of GIs cannot be transferred or assigned;
 GIs cannot be licensed to persons outside the area of the registered GI;
 GIs need not have an existing reputation, or actually be used or intended to be 
used either to obtain registration or to retain registration, and all the rights flowing 
from registration;
 GIs can never become generic once registered;
 only a member of the relevant collective or organization is entitled to use the GI, 
in relation to the foodstuffs for which it is registered, and then only in accordance 
with regulations concerning the use of the GI adopted by the collective or 
organization that owns the GI, as certified and enforced by the relevant public 
body;
 no other person is entitled to use the GI or any translation, imitation, evocation or 
modification of the GI, in association with the kind of goods for which it is 
registered, in any circumstances;
 no other person is entitled to use the GI in any way, in association or in relation to 
goods of any kind, in a manner that is liable to convey a false impression, confuse 
or mislead consumers as to the true origin of a product.
II. PROPRIETARY PROTECTION FOR REPUTATION
A. GIs as Intellectual Property
From an intellectual property policy perspective, registered GIs are primarily concerned 
with the protection of reputation adhering to distinctive signs, and against 
misrepresentations and consequent diversion of trade and dilution. But the rights in 
registered GIs have many of the hallmarks of a property right, as opposed to a mere right 
of action.16 GI registration is an a priori system of proof of validity and entitlement. 
Registration is invariably associated with proof of ownership, and thus property –
16 That is, rights with a broader application, such as actions for misleading and deceptive conduct, 
whether statutory or based on passing-off, actions for unfair competition, or competition deloyale, and 
the like.
although in this case collective rather than private property. Whatever the answer to the 
theoretical question: “Is a registered GI (intellectual) property?” may be, the essential 
point is that the a priori rights derived from registration are far more extensive than a 
right of action for misrepresentation – easily justified in terms of honest trade and 
consumer protection. Therefore, it is important to critically evaluate the theoretical 
underpinnings of those rights.
In terms of a more precise analogy, registered GIs have many structural attributes in 
common with registered trade marks. Both are concerned with goodwill. The prohibition 
on the use of either on like goods is absolute; once registered, proof of reputation is not 
required, nor does the plaintiff need to show deception, confusion or the like. Ownership 
is determined by the Register. Rights over GIs are not limited in time, as is also the case 
with registered trade marks.
B. Policy and the Analogy with Registered Trade Matters 
 
Nonetheless, there are significant differences as well. The registered GI system has an 
additional element of State intervention in the organization of production absent in 
registered trade-marks law. Furthermore, registered GIs are generally concerned with real 
names of real places. So, registered GIs are not a form of registered trade mark, even if 
one can argue that collective or certification trade marks can perform the same function.17
The critical substantive difference is that registered GIs are descriptive of real places –
which registered trade marks cannot be. As Dawson points out, “trademark law places 
geographical indications within the public domain.” 18
The critical differences in terms of legal character lie in the: 
 nature of ownership (private v. collective) and rights to assign and license;
 character of the prohibition of unauthorized use;
 use and reputation; and
 the genericness defence. 19
Many of these differences ultimately derive from the fact that trade-marks law is a 
dynamic system, whereas the registered GI system is static. Registered trade-marks law 
envisages that terms can move between the private sphere of property rights and the
17 The common-law jurisdictions tend to favour the use of certification or collective marks, whereas the 
civil-law jurisdictions of Europe have a more established tradition of relying on registration of GIs.
18  See N. Dawson, Locating Geographical Indications – Perspectives from English Law, 90 Trademark 
Reporter 590, 2000, at 601. However, that is only the case where the geographical term says something 
about the origin of the goods. If the use of the term is fanciful and neither informative nor misleading 
as to geographic origin (as opposed to commercial origin), the GI may be registered as a trade mark, 
within the normal statutory parameters.
19 As to distinguishing trade marks and GIs, see also F. Addor and A. Grazioli, Geographical Indications 
beyond Wines" and Spirit – -A Roadmap for a Better Protection for Geographical Indications in the 
WTO TRIPS Agreement, 5 J.W.I.P. 6, November 2002, 865, at 869.
public sphere of ordinary descriptive language.20 Exclusive rights to use GIs, on the other 
hand, are reserved for ever to the inhabitants of the area concerned. Arguably, as long as 
a place exists and its name exists the inhabitants of that place should not be deprived of 
their exclusive right to use that name in association with the goods they produce and 
sell.21 Whether or not they use the term for a certain period, or it is adopted by others to 
describe certain goods is then theoretically irrelevant, although it may be politically 
unavoidable.22 It is because of this descriptive connection with the physical environment 
that registered GIs are different from registered trade marks.
Irrespective of the differences, however, because of common features it makes sense to 
examine the policy grounds for the grant of property rights in trade marks, and adapt 
them to the registered GI environment. This is even more the case given the paucity of 
literature on specific GI law and theory.23
C. Consumer Search-Cost Reduction
There are various strands in the literature concerning the economic and industrial policy 
goals of trade-mark registration, or in other words, concerning the grant of property rights 
in distinctive signs that signal the trade origins of goods or services. The most well-
established justification is “search-cost reduction” for non-testable or experience goods, 
i.e. goods that cannot be tested before purchase, and the consumer having to rely on 
experience to select a purchase in the presence of heterogeneity.24 Trade marks permit 
consumers to recognize goods as coming from the same source as goods bought 
previously, and whose characteristics they prefer, thus reducing search-costs. To ensure 
that the signal performs this function reliably and consistently, it is necessary both to 
regulate the dealings of the legitimate owner with the trade mark, and to prohibit 
imitation of the trade mark. It is also required that the trade mark be distinctive,
20 For a linguistic appraisal of trade-marks law see R. Shuy, Linguistic Battles in Trade Mark Disputes, 
Palgrave, New York, 2002.
21 Or at least for as long as the place or place name remains in existence. That some GIs are accepted 
in sortie .jurisdictions and under some international instruments as generic is, from this perspective, an 
unfortunate accident of history, and not to be seen as theoretically irreversible.
22 Addor and Grazioli, sups'a, footnote 19, stress that loss of rights for GIs because of descriptiveness (or 
genericness) makes little sense because: "[a GI] is by definition descriptive because a geographic name 
denotes the geographical origin of the product it identifies." (at 871). However, think of such terms as a 
frankfurter (sausage), Bermuda shorts, or the term "panama" for a style of headwear. Descriptive of a 
place is not the same as descriptive of goods.
23 See, nonetheless, S. Escudero, International Protection of Geographical Indications and Developing 
Countries, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity, South Centre, July 2001; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Trade Directorate, Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications in OECD Member Countries: 
Economic and Legal Implications, OM/AGR/APM/TD/WP(2000)15/FINAL; Dwijen Rangnekar, 
Geographical Indications : A Review of Proposals at the TR IPS Council, UNCTAD, June 2002; P.J. 
Heald, Trademarks and Geographical Indications: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPs Agreement, 29 
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 635 1996; W~PO Symposium on the International Protection of Geographical 
Indications in the Worldwide Context, Hungary, October 1997; South Africa, September 1999; 
Montevideo, November 2001.
24 See W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30J. of Law & Eco. 
265, 1987.
i.e. different enough from other marks used in a similar product context. Only a 
distinctive mark can point the consumer to a distinctive product.
The search-cost reduction argument can be placed in a broader framework. Market 
conduct is critically determined by information, but in any given market the possession of 
information is usually asymmetric. In other words, parties to a prospective transaction 
dispose of unequal levels of information about the product concerned. There is an 
information asymmetry between the seller who knows everything about the product--and 
the buyer, who knows less about it. As a result the bargain is less than optimally efficient, 
but arriving at information symmetry is costly. Trade marks reduce the cost involved in 
overcoming the asymmetry – certainly in the case of experience good – -by providing the 
repeat customer with a relevant source of information indicating consistency of origin 
and characteristics of goods. Trade marks thus render markets more efficient.
D. Criticism of the Search-Cost Reduction Theory
Critics of the search-cost reduction theory contend that brands or trade marks, in reality, 
do not inform the rationally maximizing consumer, but rather influence the emotionally 
driven consumer by enabling “perception advertising”.25 The brand or mark is 
manipulated by its owner, shrewd perception advertising imbues the brand, and by 
association the product, with properties the consumer imagines to be desirable. This 
allows the trade-mark owner to set a higher price for the marked goods, generating higher 
returns. The consumer is prepared to pay more, not because she discerns, via the brand or 
mark, the higher quality of the underlying goods, but because the goods are rendered 
subjectively more desirable by their association with a heavily promoted brand or mark. 
This means that even though the brand or mark may be distinctive, the underlying goods 
are not necessarily so. They could well be quite homogenous, the only difference lying in 
the way they are perceived, or in their branding. This critical perspective does not support 
enhanced efficiency; it also undermines the differentiation theory of trade marks 
considered below.
E. Differentiation and Diversification
An alternative, though co-extensive, approach focuses instead on differentiation as a 
market strategy. Imagine a market without legal protection of trade marks; what incentive 
is there for a seller to augment the quality of her product? Why attempt to increase rents 
by selling different goods at a higher price if differentiation can be undermined by free-
riding competitors who mislead consumers by copying brands? Only in the presence of 
trade-mark protection is there an effective incentive to produce
25 Perception advertising is aimed at creating an artificial perception of the goods in consumers' minds 
rather than a realistic understanding of the goods' characteristics.
higher quality goods that can sell at a higher price. Thus a system of trade-mark 
protection is essential to encourage the production of a variety of goods at varying quality 
levels and varying prices, resulting in greater consumer satisfaction and efficiency. In the 
absence of legal protection for marks, all producers would logically tend to provide the 
lowest cost goods at the lowest price, with the only differentiation flowing from natural 
advantages. Thus distinctive marks will lead the consumer to distinctive products; 
differentiation results in diversification.
F. Trade Marks and Industrial Organization
Another approach emphasizes the role of trade marks in industrial organization. In an 
industrial economy, production and consumption of goods are organizationally and 
geographically dis-integrated. Horizontal integration produces economies of scale, and 
vertical dis-integration produces efficiencies through specialization. Increased 
specialization means that the tasks of producing the necessities of life are rarely 
performed by their ultimate consumers. Whereas the subsistence farmer produces many 
of the goods she will consume, or a villager purchases direct from a local farmer, the 
factory or office worker is dependent on a longer and more complex chain of supply and 
exchange to obtain consumables such as food.
Trade marks enable a producer to communicate directly and efficiently with the ultimate 
consumer in the presence of supply chain complexity. By way of the protected mark the 
producer provides a direct and consistent message, saving the costs of overcoming the 
information asymmetry by direct communication, and thus altering the parameters of 
industrial organization. The trade mark enables specialization in the roles of production, 
distribution and consumer sale. The greater the distance between producer and consumer, 
the more important brand protection will be. In a global economy the distance has 
increased markedly, even if communication methods are constantly improving.
G. Transaction Costs
But as well as enabling supply chain specialization, trade-mark protection increases 
horizontal efficiencies, because the ability to license a mark increases a firm's 
opportunities to realise efficiencies in production and distribution. Contracting, on the 
basis of property rights established a priori, reduces transaction costs. Branding allows 
cost-effective centralization of promotion and advertising, whereas production can be 
geographically and organizationally dispersed. Trade marks thus allow consistency in 
expansion over a number of differentiated markets with the most cost-efficient and 
rational allocation of production. Transport and distribution costs are reduced because 
standardized production can be effectively managed in close proximity to markets.
Transaction costs are generally reduced by a Register-based property system, ownership 
is established a priori, subject to objective criteria, as is validity. The system of 
examination reduces the number of disputes, and the cost of resolution. At the very least, 
some costs are spread over the community as a whole, or the community of users of the 
right concerned (i.e. trade-mark owners in general) rather than fully borne by a given 
firm.
H. Trade Marks as Barriers to Entry
But registered trade marks have a downside; differentiation acts as an effective barrier to 
entry and thus suppresses competition. This requires registered-trade-marks law to strike 
a careful balance in terms of the scope and extent of legal rights. Economides26 posits that 
trade marks act as a barrier to entry because an established reputation will cause 
consumers to prefer the goods with known trade marks to those with the unknown trade 
mark of a new entrant. The known-brand owner will be able to command a premium for 
his product, and wilt be encouraged to increase its quality to retain the reputation he has 
built and keep out competitors. Hence, differentiation is sometimes said to be the most 
efficient, low-cost barrier-to-entry strategy for a firm.27
However, although established differentiation raises entry barriers, it simultaneously 
makes market entry more attractive because of the premium return that the producer with 
an established reputation is observed to obtain. According to Economides, trade-mark 
protection creates a tendency toward proliferation of marks. As long as the market is 
dynamic, the overall price effect for the market segment may be tempered by the discount 
pricing of new entrants – i.e. the premium price for quality goods is offset by the 
discounted price for new entrant goods. However, this is not so if the market is static. 
Presumably it will also not be so if the market power of the established brands allows 
them to match or outlive discounting by new entrants. Again, a balance must be struck in 
terms of the ability of established trade-mark owners to exclude new entrants, so as to 
prevent loss of efficiencies of scale in production and supply.28
26  See N. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, 78 Trademark Reporter 523, 1988; see also J.S. 
Bain, Barriers to New Competition, Chapter IV, Product Differentiation Advantages of Established 
Firms as Barriers to Entry, Harvard University Press, 1956, at 114 et seq.; see further E.H. 
Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Chapter IV, The Differentiation of the Product: 
Monopolistic Competition, Harvard University Press, 1959, at 56 et seq. In Helen Norman's article 
Skechter's "The Rational Basis of Trade-Mark Protection" Revisited, she points out that Shechter's 
seminal article in the Hatward Law Review which posited that a trade mark is not so much important 
as au indication of origin, but "to create and retain custom" (at 191), published in Perspectives on IP, 
Vol. 7, TradeMarks Retrospective, S&M, 2000. She points out that this has little impact on judges in 
the U.K., who continue to interpret the Trade Marks Act narrowly without considering "what the 
proper basis for protection ought to be" (at 192).
27 See Bain, ibid., at 142 143.
28 Trade-marks law achieves this balance by various means, for instance, prohibition on registration of 
descriptive terms" the genericness defence' defences relating to use in good faith, such as comparison 
advertising; the requirement of trade-mark use etc.
I. The Economics of Language
It is a well-established principle that a private monopoly in ordinary terminology has 
anti-competitive effects. For that reason, descriptive terms or devices cannot be registered 
as trade marks. Other traders must not incur additional costs when using ordinary 
descriptors. This applies as well to geographical terms. If the use of a term is descriptive 
of its origins it cannot be registered as a trade mark; others in the area must be able to 
describe the geographical origin of their goods or services.29 If it were otherwise, a 
wholly artificial barrier to entry could be erected.
The law of trade marks also reduces the barrier effect of registration by restricting rights 
in terms that become descriptive by the defence of “genericness”. When a brand becomes 
equated with a certain kind of product, as opposed to a certain source, the owner loses 
monopoly rights by the law rendering it unenforceable or by removing it from the 
Register. The barrier to entry for competitors is then lowered.
Traditional “language economics” emphasizes that the monopolization of inherently 
distinctive, artificial terms can not be of great concern, because the supply of invented 
terms is essentially infinite.30 But others (the “critical view”) argue that not all distinctive 
marks are equal at the outset; some work better in the market and are therefore more 
desirable, and the supply of more desirable trade marks is not infinite.31 Some marks may 
be inherently more striking, or more readily remembered. The point is even more 
significant because trade-mark rules do not absolutely prohibit descriptiveness. Many 
registered marks have a descriptive element but are still sufficiently distinctive to be 
registered. For others with a descriptive element, the mark owner will have to prove a 
level of acquired distinctiveness, in other words, establish consumer recognition.
The critical view tends to require a stricter adherence to the rules of trade-marks law that 
distinguish terms that can and terms that cannot be monopolized; above all, the 
requirement of trade-marks use32 and the requirements of proof of distinctiveness. 
Underlying the critical view is a realisation that the question of monopoly in a mark is not 
simply an abstract question relating to words alone. The significance of monopolies in 
words relates not to the market for words as such but to the competition in markets for 
goods described by those words.
This is significant in terms of registered GIs, where there is no real-use requirement, there 
is no defence of genericness, and inherently descriptive terms are, per definition,
29 See, for example, Clark Equipment Co. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1964) 111 CLR 511 ; Oxford 
University Press" v. Registrar of Trade Marks', (1990) 24 FCR 1.
30 See Landes and Posner, supra, footnote 24, at 271
31 See A.L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 Yale Law Journal 759, 1990.
32 As to the importance of adherence to this requirement of use, see M. Davis, Death of a Salesman's 
Doctrine: A Critical Look at Trademark Use, 19 Georgia Law Review 2, 233, 1985.
registrable without showing any proof of reputation. Implications flow in relation to 
access to markets for the kinds of goods marked with registered GIs.
III. APPLYING THEORY TO REGISTERED GIs
A. GIs and Search-Costs
Information asymmetry is most significant in the context of experience goods, i.e. goods 
that are not testable at purchase. In modern times most foodstuffs, including wine and 
spirits, are experience goods and non-testable. This is even more so for the products for 
which GI protection is most ardently sought, such as wines, which have a reputation 
wider than just local. In that sense, legal protection of signs used in relation to these types 
of goods is prima facie acceptable within the broader framework of the search-cost 
reduction theory.
This acceptance is tempered by whatever credence one may give to the critical view, i.e. 
that the brand does little more than enable perception advertising, influencing the 
emotions of the consumer rather than the consumer as rational maximizer. To overcome 
this type of criticism, and maintain search-cost reduction, an ideal system might, by 
regulation, attempt to ensure that consumers' perception of the brand closely 
approximates real, as opposed to perceived, product qualities. Registered GI systems that 
impose product standards as well as origin requirements arguably do just that. However, 
if use of the registered GI is not subject to product standards but only origin rules, then
the alleged masking effect may potentially be enhanced.
Individual registered trade-mark owners decide the quality of their products 
independently. The law does not stop brand-owners from diluting the quality of the 
branded goods. But the trade-mark owner is indirectly restrained by commercial self-
interest; the risk that the brand's reputation, and hence ability to generate surplus rents, is 
destroyed in the process of quality dilution. Registered GIs are different in that they are 
collectively owned. Whereas the registered trade mark's individual owner is indirectly 
and commercially restrained from varying the quality of goods excessively over time, the 
commercial self-interest of one legitimate user of a GI may not be sufficient to protect all 
its other legitimate users.
Thus, if left unregulated, the independent commercial decision of one registered GI user 
to reduce quality may affect its value for all other legitimate users. The risk cannot be 
overcome by relying on commercial self-interest alone, since one local user may be 
tempted to trade-off long-term damage to the GI's reputation, that might also accrue to 
other users, against short-term returns that might accrue to him through “misusing” the 
GI.33 The only way to overcome this risk is to restrict the tendency of users of a registered 
GI to vary the underlying quality of the product. In the absence of such regulation the 
33  What is meant by "misuse" might, for example, be the selling of goods with inferior ingredients under 
the GI.
search-cost reduction effect of a GI may be reduced: the symbol is rendered unreliable, as 
the behaviour of its multiple legitimate users is less predictable.
B. Product Differentiation, Consumer Protection and Transaction Costs
In a more general sense, by analogy with trade marks, the economic purpose of GIs is to 
encourage diversification in food supply. In terms of rural produce, application of 
idiosyncratic, traditional and labour-intensive processes results in product variations and 
higher prices. Value-adding in rural locations will result in the loss of economies of scale 
compared to bulk supply and industrial processing. Allocation of legal rights in relation 
to relevant signifiers enables producers to translate higher production costs into higher 
returns, while avoiding free-riding.
The grant of GI registration is one possible allocation system. But why prefer it over 
simply relying on a general action against commercial misrepresentation? One reason has 
already been mentioned: to prevent dilution in the presence of multiple right holders. 
Another significant reason relates to transaction costs. The general advantages of a priori 
system of GI registration are the same as for trade marks, as canvassed above. 
Additionally, in the context of GIs, a difficulty arises in determining who amongst 
competing genuine claimants, usually from contiguous or homonymous areas, has the 
right to use a regional signifier. A considerable saving may flow from delineating the 
precise margins of geographical areas a priori, rather than ex post, in the context of a 
dispute. A social premium results, as the advantages of pre-delineation of an area will 
extend to a wider number of parties than just those involved in a dispute.
C. The Uniqueness Principle
The product differentiation approach to trade-mark theory demands that distinctive trade 
marks mean distinctive goods. Trade marks enable the mark owner to produce goods that 
differ from the common standard. However, nothing other than commercial necessity (the 
need to preserve her reputation) requires the trade-mark owner to make a product that is 
different. A registered trade mark is not a guarantee of the uniqueness of the marked 
product. In terms of GIs, the differentiation argument is taken a step further. A region has 
unique geographic and human characteristics, not replicable in any other region; these 
characteristics imbue regional agricultural products with unique qualities. Since goods 
emanating from another region must, by definition, be different, there can be no 
justification for using the same geographical term to describe goods from a different 
region. It will ipso facto be a misrepresentation to do so, so a priori rights make more 
sense than an action which requires – in fact superfluous – proof of misrepresentation. In 
that way there is a much stronger link between the distinctiveness of the GI and the 
uniqueness of the underlying product, and an even stronger justification for a priori, 
broad proprietary rights.
However, this argument depends on the validity of the proposition that a product can and 
does uniquely reflect local characteristics and cannot be replicated elsewhere, an issue 
discussed further below. But if one accepts the uniqueness principle, it again demands a 
system that has stringent product-standard controls and adheres strictly to the requirement 
of geographic origin. Otherwise the GI cannot be guaranteed to represent the unique 
characteristics of the goods of the originating region, and extensive a priori rights will 
not be warranted.
D. Registered GIs and industrial Organization
As mentioned earlier, a key factor in the growth of brands and their legal regulation is the 
separation between consumer and producer. During the industrial era this distancing 
process accelerated rapidly for manufactured goods, but arguably less for agricultural 
goods. But now that agriculture has embraced modern packaging, transport and global 
trade, the separation between consumer and producer has rapidly increased. In such 
circumstances, registered GIs are one method by which a small-scale producer, far 
removed geographically and structurally from the consumer, can reach through to that 
consumer with a consistent quality message. Naturally, that can also be done by way of 
ordinary trade marks, and the choice between trade mark and GI-based strategies is a 
significant question.
GI registration also promotes rationalization of costs of promotion, because advertising 
expenditures can be shared by a number of non-competing producers. If those producers 
already supply homogenous products, duplication of the costs of promotion is avoided. 
The tentative conclusion flowing from the above is that there may be a reasonably sound 
theoretical basis for a system of registered GIs. But this is only the case if such a system 
requires, first, adherence to strict rules of origin, and second, strict product standards. 
However, a system of registered GIs with such characteristics suffers from significant 
drawbacks, as analysed below.  But before addressing the drawbacks in strong GI 
protection, it is important to re-visit one of the central tenets of GI registration along the 
European model: the uniqueness principle.
IV. THE DRAWBACKS INHERENT IN A SYSTEM OF REGISTERED GIs
A. Distinctive Signs for Distinctive Products
A critical distinction between GIs and comparable legal regimes lies in the approach to 
terms that become generic. This distinction is significant in the divide between the EU 
and some New World States about future global GI protection. A core justification 
proffered for GI protection without a genericness defence is the uniqueness principle: the 
name of a region, when used by producers outside the region, is unavoidably misleading 
because those products could never have the unique regional characteristics required.
The name of a region can, a fortiori, never become a general descriptor of a category or 
kind of goods.
The uniqueness principle is not universally accepted. Taking the example of wine, it may 
be the case that if grapes come from a very small denomination that is geographically 
homogenous and distinct, and the wine is consistently produced by idiosyncratic 
methods, it cannot be replicated anywhere else. This proposition is difficult to test, but it 
must become more doubtful the larger the denomination and the more varied the
geography. For other products, the proposition may be even more doubtful. For cheese, 
for instance, there is unlikely to be a discernable difference between products from 
different regions as long as certain transferable methods are observed in the derivation 
and making.34
Production methods may, in general, be far more significant to the characteristics of 
agricultural products than geographic origin. While geographic characteristics are 
obviously not transferable, but are rarely absolutely unique, even the most unusual 
methods of growing and processing crops can be copied, and skills transferred or learned. 
In many ways the latter is exactly what did happen when wine-makers from Europe 
established themselves in the New World, for example, in Australia. Accepting this has 
far-reaching consequences, as it not only undermines the uniqueness principle it also 
undermines the consumer-protection function of registered GIs. In other words, whereas 
there may be no difficulty in accepting that the law should be structured to ensure that
traders correctly indicate where goods originate (actions against misrepresentation), it is 
harder to accept that the law should reinforce the arguably questionable perception that 
goods bear unique characteristics because of their place of origin (strong GI registration 
systems). Criticism of the uniqueness proposition is particularly significant in the context 
of the prohibition on any form of generic use of a GI.
Even if one accepts that a product can uniquely reflect the conditions of its geographical 
origins, there are still significant concerns with a registered GI system along European 
lines.
B. Barriers to Market Entry, Competition Distortions and Protectionism
Proponents of GI registration argue that it has pro-competitive effects, as it enables small-
and family-based rural industries to resist industrial consolidation. Thus, continuous use 
of traditional and labour-intensive methods in areas with special characteristics will only 
take place in the presence of strong property rights in GIs, also serving social, industrial, 
economic and regional policy goals.
But this comes at a cost. Opponents would stress that strong GI protection distorts
34  See W. Moran, Rural Space as Intellectual Property, Political Geography 12,263, 1993, at 274.
competition as it supports inefficient rural production and land-use and prevents 
efficiencies in agricultural production that will deliver both variety and lower prices.
The distortions to competition caused by strong GI rights principally affect producers 
(just) outside the boundaries of the region, producers within the region intending to adopt 
uncertified production techniques, and producers intending to use the GI descriptively in 
markets where it has, in fact, become generic. If the conditions of geographic origin and 
product standards are strictly adhered to, the distorting effect is at least partially offset by 
countervailing benefits to consumers. But if the rules ensuring observance of these 
conditions are not sufficiently stringent, there is a risk of “slippage”: from benign 
intervention in agricultural production into detrimental protectionism. This has been 
considered in some decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In Sekt and 
Weinbrand, the ECJ ruled that to turn indirect generic names into indirect GIs was 
discriminatory.35 To warrant GI registration distinctive qualities and characteristics were 
required,36 otherwise the purpose of imposing the restrictions flowing from registration is 
not fulfilled. However, in Exportur it was held that a distinctive reputation was 
sufficient.37
This reinforces the argument that registration of GIs should be conditional on the strict 
observance of effective quality standards and on the products reflecting the unique 
characteristics of the region. It is essential to prevent slippage in the formulation and 
application of the legal rules that ensure observance in practice of these two conditions. 
Any system of GI registration must be critically evaluated from this point of view. The 
legitimacy of the system, in the face of its distorting effects, can only flow from the 
uniqueness of the products of a region, and from a guarantee of consistent quality.38
C. Competition, Territoriality and Rural Policy
Moran stresses that policy in relation to legal protection of GIs reflects the way in which 
governments "provided differential opportunities for their citizens and industries".39 
Doubting the link between geographical features and quality of wines, he sees rather that 
unsubstantiated assertions about environmental influences are “used to assert and justify 
35  Case 12/74 Sekt and Weinbrand, [1975] ECR 181.
36 See J. Armistead, Whose Cheese is it Anyway? Correctly Slicing European Regulation concerning 
Protections for Geographic indications, 10 Transnat'l  L. & Contemp. Probs. 303, 2000, at 309-310.
37 Exportur, [1992] Ecr< 1-5529. Armistead, ibid. at 322, argues that without the quality link, the 
protection of a GI may amount to protectionism.
38 However, some commentators, such as Moran, supra, footnote 34, go further, arguing that the 
distorting effects always outweigh the putative benefits, because the claim that a product can uniquely 
reflect the characteristics of a region is unfounded. No region is, in fact, unique; and it is always 
possible to obtain products with the stone characteristics from other regions, since the inputs and 
processes which give rural produce their special characteristics can be replicated in many other places. 
If that is the case, then the granting of GI protection, certainly where the term has become generic for 
many consumers, is arguably a form of protectionism. If both location A and B can make and supply 
the product, which is known by the name of region A, why should only A be allowed to do so?
39 W. Moran, Wine Appellations as Territory in France and California, 83 Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, Vol. 4, 1993, 694-717, at 695.
political and territorial control, and thereby influence the distribution of the industry”.40
In the prototypical case of wine, the question can be put: “Are wine delimitations really 
determined by geography, or rather by politics?” Moran's answer undermines the cardinal 
principle underlying appellation of origin (AOC) -type registration of GIs in the wine 
industry: that it can be empirically proven that the quality of wine is determined directly 
by the geography of an area. He argues that the location of prime wine-growing regions 
in France has moved over time "partly as the result of the regional localization of political 
power."41 Moran notes that there is a striking unity between political entities (i.e. political 
subdivisions such as Communes) and AOC-entitled entities. The quality of wines in 
certain regions has, in Moran's opinion, more to do with consistent attempts at improving 
techniques and adapting them to the environment, which have resulted in optimization 
over time. Many more regions than are now established would be open to this process, 
but it is not in the interests of established higher-level AOC regions to encourage such 
transfers of skills and processes.
Whether or not one accepts that geography uniquely determines quality, Moran's 
analytical framework draws attention to the territorial effects of strong GI regulation. 
Other industries, or alternative land uses, are displaced by the registration system,42 and 
land values are maintained in areas which otherwise may have limited agricultural uses. It 
would seem that in fertile agricultural areas which are or could be put to competing 
productive land uses, a registration system will entrench existing uses that are not 
necessarily optimal, and experimentation with different crops or rural products will be 
discouraged.
On the other hand, GI registration is also used to reduce agricultural overproduction. An 
increase in the areas under AOCs in France – in areas in the south where few AOCs 
existed – has coincided with policies of the EU directed at eliminating lower-quality 
vines in a bid to reduce over-production of wine.43 But Moran stresses that it is dificult 
for new areas to compete with established AOCs, even if they produce quality wines.44 
Thus, established AOC areas benefit from a distortion in competition in the market for 
wines of similar quality. This use of registered GIs to limit territorial overproduction is 
significant. In countries that suffer from rural over-production, whether because of 
subsidization or for other reasons, it may make sense; however, countries whose primary 
aim is self-sufficiency in agricultural products and maximization of efficient allocation of 
rural resources, might take a different view.
40 Ibid., at 694.
41 Ibid., at 705.
42 Furthermore, producers within an area who do not want to adhere to the specifications, cannot use the 
name of the place where they are based; this imposes a restriction on their ability to trade and compete.
43 See Moran, supra, footnote 39, at 699.
44 Ibid., at 709.
D. Flexibility v. Legitimacy
Registered GIs thus distort competitive land use and rural production, protecting certain 
land uses, production methods and forms of industrial organization at the expense of 
potentially more efficient alternatives. Crucial to counterbalancing these effects is 
adherence to stringent product standards and rules of geographic origin. Otherwise the 
system may amount to little more than complex, distorting and impenetrable 
protectionism. However, such stringent regulation imposes detrimental rigidities. Hence, 
every system of GI registration struggles to accommodate the tension between, on the one 
hand, the legitimacy derived from strict quality and origin rules, and on the other hand, 
the desire to assuage the detrimental effects of rigid regulation by adopting more liberal 
rules relating to geographical origin and product standards. Somewhere the balance must 
be struck. Arguably, because of the scepticism about geographic uniqueness and the 
natural variations within even the smallest geographical areas, to ensure that GIs fulfil 
their function of a meaningful quality signal, the emphasis should be on rigid adherence 
to consistent product standards.45 Relaxation of geographical origin rules may be 
acceptable, even if only within very limited parameters.
The detrimental rigidities that flow from a registered GI system are restrictions on supply, 
on methods of production, and on technological innovation. These are further explored 
below.
E. Geographic Origin Rules as Restrictions on Supply
A registered GI system does not only suffer from restrictions on the methods that can be 
applied in rural production, but also on the volume of production.46 This flows both from 
the requirement of geographic connection, and from the need to adhere to production 
levels by restraining production standards.47 The focus in this Section is on the 
requirement of geographical origin; in the next Section the focus is on innovation and 
restrictive production standards. Geographical limits restrain the ability of a local 
industry to respond flexibly to natural variations in production levels. It may also impede 
flexible responses to market signals, in particular variations in demand in the presence of 
a relative inability to vary price.
45 This does not mean that it is not important to maintain the transaction cost advantages by having clear 
a priori delineations. Rather, it may be the case that products should still be entitled to use a GI even if 
some of the production steps occurred outside the region concerned. This point is illustrated further 
below by way of a brief comparison between the Australian and the French system of GI registration 
for wines.
46 Indeed, according to some, this is virtually the main point of the system: to limit overproduction; see, 
for instance, Moran, supra, footnote 34.
47 See Moran, supra, footnote 39, where he analyses the production level/quality level connection in wine 
production, and the fact that one of the principle aims of adherence to certain agricultural methods is 
reducing production. It is well illustrated by the AOC/AOP system, which requires all phases--
production, processing and preparation-- to occur within the geographical area.
Agricultural industries are subject to meteorological and other natural hazards, and thus 
production levels within a given area, particularly if it is small, can be irregular and 
unpredictable. Strong GI registration systems leave no effective response for this kind of 
eventuality, because the product cannot be imported from outside. The loss of returns in a 
low-yielding season can only partly be offset by the price premium that can be charged in 
the better seasons. In any case, producers incur costs in dealing with an uneven income 
spread. The problem is at its most acute if GI registration requires all elements of 
production, processing and preparation to occur within the area as, for instance, for 
European protected designations of origin (PDOs).48 By contrast, European "protected" 
GI (PG1) requirements are inherently more flexible: only one facet of production, 
processing or preparation need take place within the designated area.49 If this is 
processing or preparation, then obviously the product can be sourced from outside, thus 
alleviating the supply problem.
Yet products may suffer in terms of reputation if the link with a locality is more tenuous, 
which may not satisfy consumers looking for a strong geographical identity. In a broad 
policy sense, the risk is that the connection becomes entirely tenuous and quite 
misleading, and the aims of the system are effectively subverted. If the justification for 
strong GI protection is that the growers of a certain area are exclusively entitled to use a 
geographical term because only their area can impart certain unique qualities to the goods 
concerned, then the PGI approach is questionable. Product produced elsewhere should 
not have the GI used in association with it, because it could not possibly have the same 
characteristics as the product produced within the GI area.
If greater flexibility exists in terms of sourcing products, then it is even more essential 
that strict processing and preparation standards are observed. From this perspective, the 
system of registered PGIs under Regulation 2081/92 in the EU at least requires adherence 
to production "specifications" which will ensure consistency over time.50 However, 
rigorous rules in specifications concerning processing and preparation themselves also 
limit production levels, and thus place constraints on growth of the rural industry 
concerned. This poses a general problem of inflexibility in product development and a 
stifling of innovation, which is further examined below.
F. Registered GIs, Innovation and Diffusion
If a legitimate system of GI registration requires, in addition to rules of origin, a 
specification which ensures consistent application of production standards, the negative
48 As based on Regulation 2081/92, 14 July 1992, on the protection of geo~'aphical indications and 
designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, O.J. L 208, 24 July 1992. See further 
below.
49 Perversely, one could say that the Australian system, which has larger and more varied delineations, 
thereby reduces the risks of irregular production levels within the denomination.
50 There is a proviso, in particular in relation to wine: the consistent application of certain techniques is 
no guarantee for consistent quality over the years. This is particularly the case in regions with 
chronologically inconsistent weather and growth patterns.
result is a significant brake on innovation. From one point of view, this might be seen not 
as a problem, but as the essential benefit of registered GIs: to resist innovation, i.e. to 
grant some level of protection for traditional production methods. This may well be an 
advantage where traditional production methods, localized and artisanal in character, are 
well established. However, if that is not the case, a system of GIs with rigid specifications 
has far fewer attractions. In other words, where there are no long-established artisanal 
production methods, the trade-off in terms of constraints on innovation may render 
registered GIs unattractive – compared, for instance, to corporate brands – for the 
establishment of new value-added rural industries.5l
But even where localized and traditional production methods are well established, the 
brake on innovation is a serious concern. Even if a system of registered GIs allows some 
innovation, the collective consultations and agreement required are necessarily 
cumbersome and slow, preventing rapid adaptation to changing competitive 
environments. The system is also inherently conservative and it is, therefore, somewhat 
contradictory to emphasize the potential for innovation that is theoretically present. While 
innovation is not impossible, it is likely to fall within a very narrow band of likely 
changes.52 Innovation in this sense is not only technological or related to agricultural 
science or new crops, but also adaptation to new market conditions.
An interesting case in point is the comparison often drawn between the Australian and the 
French wine industries. The latter, at least in those areas covered by AOCs, is prisoner to 
rigid production methods, vested rural interests and established local land values. 
Competition by way of innovation within the national wine industry is suppressed or 
distorted, leaving the door open for foreign competition which relies on innovation and 
flexibility to respond to consumer demand.
In effect, in terms of competition in the market for foodstuffs, under a system of 
registered GIs all the competitive eggs are in one basket: regional brand promotion. 
Innovation as a way of competing effectively is limited in those areas governed by 
registered GIs, and is displaced to areas outside the delimitations.53 As shown above, 
those areas are at a competitive advantage in terms of innovation, but their quality 
message will have a difficult time breaking through.
A final point about flexibility. Constraints on innovation and limits on supply are closely 
linked questions; agricultural innovation includes experimenting with the planting and 
production of new crops. A system which restricts the ability to innovate or experiment in 
this manner may be of little concern in the context of well-established patterns of
51 Absolute protection also gives a degree of monopoly over the way the product is made, in particular in 
relation to indirect GIs.
52 Innate conservatism springs from a preference for the known over the uncertain. Moran describes how 
French wine-makers returned to the same varietals after the phylloxera crisis, and did not take the 
opportuuity to assess alternatives and innovate: see Moran, supra, footnote 39, at 700.
53 Moran puts it as follows: "Countries adopting systems of geographic indications which are too rigid or 
restrictive may find that they undermine the innovation and flexibility that is one foundation of the 
success of their industries.": see Moran, supra, footnote 39, at 716.
planting and production resulting from experimentation over wider areas for a long 
period of time. Moran points out that in Europe, there was a long period of 
experimentation with the planting of vines in different areas, often for personal 
consumption on mixed farms, before production for commercial purposes became 
concentrated in certain naturally adapted regions.54 However, in New World agriculture 
that process of experimentation is ongoing, and it would perhaps be counter-productive to 
place artificial barriers in its path. In other words, diffusion of production will be 
stymied; furthermore, so will, arguably, the diffusion of optimal production techniques. 
Moran illustrates it as follows:
“The appellation system itself ensures that the methods of exploiting the natural 
advantages for viticulture and wine-making built up in Burgundy over centuries 
cannot be captured by regions other than Burgundy.'”55
G. Licensing and Exploitation of Registered
On a different level, the rigidity inherent in a registered GI system expresses itself in 
legal terms in a prohibition on licensing. In contrast, registered trade marks can be 
relatively freely licensed. It has been pointed out above that the licensing of trade marks 
reduces transaction costs, and enables rationalization of production and economies of 
scale and stability in supply in widely diverse markets.
The inability to license a GI has some detrimental economic effects. The owner of a
registered trade mark can engender competition amongst potential licensees who 
manufacture branded goods and generate economies of scale in production.56 Similar 
efficiencies could flow if a registered GI could be attached to goods that have not been 
produced, processed or prepared in the delineated region, but simply have characteristics 
that have become associated with a certain geographic term over time.57 For instance, if 
the only requirement is that the raw product originates in the region, then firms outside 
the region can be licensed to process or prepare it, thus engendering economies of scale, 
and competition between processors. Alternatively, if the product must be processed 
within the region, but not necessarily produced, then again there can be economies of 
scale and efficiencies in licensing producers outside the region to produce the product to 
be processed within it, and so on. Of course, if there was no requirement for geographical 
connection but only for adherence to the specifications, then even more flexible licensing 
practices would be possible. But those circumstances bring a return to the same point 
made above – if there is no geographical link with an area, there is no justification for 
strong GI rights. The system becomes gradually more protectionist, and one might as 
well rely on an ordinary registered trade mark or certification mark.
54 See Moran, supra, footnote 34, at 266.
55 See ibid., at 273.
56 For instance, because a single factory produces goods for various unrelated brand owners, to be sold 
under different brand names.
57 Moran makes reference to "Bleu de Bresse" a non-registered cheese GI licensed for production in New 
Zealand; see Moran, supra, footnote 34, at 274.
From the above one might reasonably conclude that in the absence of an established 
system of GI registration, the arguments in favour of establishing a separate regulatory 
structure which enforces rules of origin and product standards do not clearly outweigh the 
arguments against. This is certainly the case in the absence of agricultural over-
production, and where there is no established policy of State intervention or high levels 
of regulation of agricultural industries. It is also the case if the broader regulatory context 
supports modernization, flexibility and innovation in rural industries. In the light of this 
conclusion, the development of GI registration in Europe provides some insights into the 
historic dynamics now at play in the negotiations within the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) concerning the multilateral 
register and expansion of higher level protection to foodstuffs other than wine.
PART 1I:  In Part II of this article some aspects of the historical development and present 
regulatory structures of GI registration in Europe and the New World are examined. This 
examination will highlight the fact that current proposals for increased GI registration 
worldwide are part of a historical continuum, and that a registration system along EU 
lines is potentially onerous and invasive.
